ABSTRACT:
In order to develop the countrys economy, the Government of Vietnam has tried to improve its FDI policy framework as already discussed, to attract not only FDI quantity but also the desired FDI quality. Generally, the Vietnamese government has introduced tax incentives for hi-tech FDI projects, FDI projects generating large employment, FDI in difficult socio-economic regions, FDI in target sectors such as agriculture, health and education, and FDI projects in special economic zones. The following sections critically investigate whether the patterns of FDI inflows in Vietnam have achieved the aims and targets of Vietnams government policies, and offer some evidence-based explanations for the actual outcomes of FDI flow to Vietnam.
Keywords: FDI?model, policy, renovation.
1. FDI inflows by provincial distribution
Vietnam has 63 provinces (actually 58 provinces andthe five centrally controlled cities of Ha Noi, Hai Phong, Da Nang, Ho Chi Minh City and Can Tho). The provinces are grouped by the Vietnamese government in six regions, namely, Red River Delta; Northern Midlands and Mountain Areas; North Central and Central Coastal Areas; Central Highlands; South East and Mekong River Delta. This regional grouping of provinces is merely for development planning purpose and there is no regional government body or intra-regional coordination among the provinces within a region. Although Vietnam has one legal and policy system that applies to the whole country, different provinces can have different means of attracting FDI inflows, for reasons such as capacity in FDI policy implementation and the economic conditions in each province.
All 63 provinces of Vietnam have attracted FDI, but it has been unevenly established in the various provinces. So far, overseas investors have located their investments mostly in urban areas. The FDI inflows to Vietnam can be divided into five periods related to amendments to the LFI, which might help to explain the provincial and regional distribution of FDI. In the period 1988 - 1992, among the six regions, only five regions received FDI inflows and the South East region received the highest volume of FDI with more than 72% of the total FDI projects. In the following two periods of 1993 - 1996 and 1997 - 2000, FDI was more evenly distributed in all six regions with significant increases in the Red River Delta and Central Highlands. Influenced by the LFI 1996, FDI inflows increased in the North Central and Central Coastal areas, Central Highlands and the Mekong River Delta. The periods 2001 - 2005 and 2006 - 2012 saw small FDI increases in the Northern Midlands and Mountain areas but the South East region remained dominant.
Although FDI policies tried to broaden regional diversity, the main distribution of FDI still remained in the South East and Red River Delta. The result of increasing FDI to these two regions may be the most beneficial and effective given the countrys competitive environment and location advantage; however, this outcome is not a good one in whole perspective because it can cause wide gaps in economic development resulted from FDI effects between regions within the country. As of December 2012, the South East region accounted for the largest share of FDI inflows with 47.03% of the total planned FDI and 56.97% of the total FDI projects, and the Red River Delta region accounted for the second largest share of FDI inflows with 23.16% of the total planned FDI and 27% of the total FDI projects. By contrast, the Northern Midlands and Mountain areas attracted only 1.95% of the total planned FDI with 2.58% of the total FDI projects, and the Central Highlands area attracted only 0.39% of the total planned FDI with 0.94% of the total FDI projects.
Seven of the 63 provinces and cities in Vietnam - Ho Chi Minh City and its neighbouring provinces such as Ba Ria - Vung Tau, Dong Nai and Binh Duong in the South East region and Ha Noi and its neighbouring provinces such as Hai Phong and Hai Duong in the Red River Delta region - attracted more than US$130.4 billion, accounting for more than 61.9% of the total planned FDI. Of the total FDI registered by Vietnam in the period 1988 - 2012, Ho Chi Minh City, Ba Ria - Vung Tau and Ha Noi accounted for more than 15.39%, 12.49% and 10.07%, respectively .
To explain this imbalance, it is reasoned that overseas investors have located their investments mostly in both the South East and Red River Delta because these regions have the biggest cities, including Ho Chi Minh City and Ha Noi, which are the commercial and administrative centres of the country. These areas have the advantages of a strong base of industrial, technological and human resources as well as having developed infrastructure such as airports, highways, bridges and telecommunications. Additionally, big cities tend to attract the best educated and talented citizenry from their neighbouring provinces as well as having more active and influential business associations, leading to greater cross-fertilisation of ideas between the public and private sectors.
The literature argues that FIEs might benefit from the concentration of urbanisation because such concentration can help them to enhance their levels of technology and reap economies of scale due to knowledge spill overs, availability of human capital and the use of joint networks of suppliers and distributors. Further, FIEs might benefit from the presence of their fellow investors, who are either their competitors or their suppliers, since such a presence might help them gain valuable information. FIEs might also obtain other positive externalities from agglomeration, including complementarity between industries and experienced local administration.
Importantly, the local governments in these provinces and cities are aware of the role of FDI in socio-economic development so they are more motivated and capable of attracting FDI inflows into their provinces/cities. It is argued that provinces pursuing an FDI favourable environment in the liberalisation process such as Binh Duong and Dong Nai may benefit from first-mover advantages to develop into hubs of economic activity, especially in terms of attracting FDI to develop the provincial economy. For instance, Dong Nai was one of the top ten largest provinces attracting FDI, with 1,101 FDI projects and $US19.94 billion of registered FDI by 2012 (GSO 2013). Dinh Quoc Thai, Chairman of the People's Committee of Dong Nai province, has acknowledged that FDI has played a critical role in developing Dong Nai provinces economy, accounting for 91% of imports and exports, employing about 500,000 employees and contributing 40% of the provinces revenue. To achieve this, the provincial government of Dong Nai has applied the policy called the government accompanying with enterprises and has focused on improving administrative procedures at the levels from provincial to ward government (Dinh 2013).
Theoretically, informal institutions such as the practices of law enforcement by local government might influence provincial FDI distribution in a country. In transition economies, reform initially concern primarily formal institutions at the national level, then this directly affects formal institutions at the provincial level. The implementation of law and regulations issued by central governments might vary because of variations of normative or cognitive aspects of local policy makers. Like other transitional countries, including China, Vietnam has implemented decentralization policy. Provincial governments might decide how to practise policies set at central level. When local governments have friendly and supportive treatment to reduce difficulties and transaction costs for business establishment, these provinces can obtain preferences from foreign investors. By contract, if local governments have conservative inherited norms and lack of recognition of the purpose of regulatory changes, foreign investors might face a lot of red tape at the local level such as delays in administrative progress, which in turn, can lead to a deterrent to inward FDI.
However, offering these tax incentives has not been able to attract inward FDI to provinces with extreme socio-economic difficulties, including Bac Kan, Cao Bang, Lai Chau, Dien Bien, Quang Binh, Gia Lai and Kon Tum. For example, Dien Bien province could not attract any FDI project from 2006 to 2012 and Lai Chau province could not attract FDI inflows from 2009 to 2012. Although, in general, tax incentives can attract FDI inflows to Vietnam, they have not achieved the objectives of the governments tax incentive policy for attracting FDI flows to areas with extreme socio-economic difficulties as well as areas with socio-economic difficulties. This might be because economic conditions of these provinces are too poor to help FIEs to be successful even when they gain special incentives. This is a bad thing because these provinces do not have the kind of infrastructure and capacity to develop opportunities to take advantages of FDI to develop their economies.
2. FDI inflows by source country
As at the end of 2012, overseas direct investors in Vietnam came from more than 90 nations and territories around the world; however, Asian nations have accounted for the majority of FDI inflows. Indeed, of the total of US$ 210.5 billion of planned FDI with 14,522 FDI projects in Vietnam, seven of the ten largest foreign investors are from the Asian nations of Japan, Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea, Hong Kong, Malaysia and Thailand.
Among these seven countries, Japan is the main foreign investor with US$29 billion of planned FDI and 1,849 FDI projects, followed by Taiwan with US$27.1 billion and 2,234 FDI projects and Singapore with US$24.9 billion and 1,119 FDI projects (see Table 3). The capital invested by these nations accounts for more than 63.53% of accumulated FDI in Vietnam, whereas the United States, British Virgin Islands and Cayman Islands have played less important roles. The US and Cayman Islands have both constituted 8.56% and British Virgin Islands 7.31%. The investments from European nations were still small in 1988–2016, accounting for about 10% of the numbers of projects, 15% of the registered FDI and 20% of the implemented FDI.
From 2002 to 2012, the share of planned FDI flows from OECD countries in Vietnam increased very quickly. For example, Japan increased from US$102 million in 2002 to US$945.3 million in 2005 and US$5,593.1 million in 2012; Singapore increased from US$42.2 million in 2002 to US$247 million in 2005 and US$1,938 million in 2012; and South Korea increased from US$267.3 million in 2002 to US$929.4 million in 2005 and US$1,285.2 million in 2012. It is consistent with the main message of Vernons Product Life Cycle theory, which indicates that FIEs develop new products in their home nations, using local resources and technologies to respond to domestic market demand, and after that they diffuse the innovations to other countries step by step, first to nations that are close to the stage of development achieved by the home nation and then to developing economies. Dunnings theory also argued that multinationals invest in an overseas destination when demand in that destination is expected to be able to support local production and they invest in low cost locations, such as developing nations, when cost pressure become intense. FIEs shift production to developing nations when product standardisation and market saturation give rise to price competition and cost pressures. Thus, Vietnam is a destination in which FDI from OECD countries should flow to. In other words, FDI from OECD countries flows to Vietnam, where labour costs are low, is considered a good way to reduce input costs, which in turn can help them to gain more benefits.
Although in recent years, FDI flow from developed countries to Vietnam has increased, the main sources of FDI inflows to Vietnam over the past two decades remain to come from developing Asian countries. In comparison with FDI projects from developed countries, FDI projects from developing countries use lower or even out-dated technology as Dunnings theory has argued: FDI from developing nations flows to low technology production, whereas FDI from developed nations flows to high technology production. The Vietnamese government has offered tax incentives for FDI projects using high technology but this aim has not been achieved. According to Decree No: 124/2008/ND-CP on December 11, 2008, FDI projects using high technology can obtain the incentive tax rate of 10% for 15 years and receive a full exemption on corporate income tax for the first four years of operations and a 50% reduction on the corporate income tax rate for the subsequent nine years, but Vietnam has not attracted FDI projects with high technology as expected.
Several observations can be made. One is that FDI projects using high technology in industries such as oil and gas, telecommunications and electronic and automobile account for a small share, whereas FDI projects using low or medium levels of technology in sectors such as food, beverage, textiles, garments, leather and furniture manufacturing industries account for the major part of FDI. Another reason is that the majority of FIEs in Vietnam are small and medium enterprises from Asian countries which themselves do not have access to the latest technology. Additionally, about 40% of equipment and machinery imported by FIEs is over 10 years old, suggesting that the transfer of advanced technology in these cases has been limited. The low skills quality of the labour force in Vietnam has also limited opportunities to attract high technology FDI projects.
It is reported that in 2012, the number of FDI projects using high technology in Vietnam is very low in comparison with other countries. Only 5 – 6% of FDI projects in Vietnam use advanced technology; over 80% of FDI projects use average technology; and about 14% of FDI enterprises use low and out-dated technology. As Dao Quang Thu, Deputy Minister of Planning and Investment of Vietnam, has claimed, since the use of technology in FDI projects is not high, so the technology transfer between businesses is limited. Because of using low technology, FDI firms in Vietnam have mainly performed processing for foreign partners. Some businesses have used high technology but high-tech stage performance has not occurred in Vietnam (Dao 2013). This evidence shows that the policy on attracting high-tech FDI projects in Vietnam has not been as effective as intended because despite government policies offering great incentives to high-tech FDI projects, most FDI projects in this country are small in scale with moderate technology. As already noted, FDI sources in Vietnam are mainly from Asia and invest mainly in labour-intensive sectors using low technology. Besides, low skilled labour in Vietnam can lead to barriers for this country to attract high-tech FDI projects.
3. FDI inflows by ownership structure
When a multinational corporation seeks to invest equity in a foreign nation, it has to decide whether to establish a wholly owned subsidiary or involve a subsidiary with shared ownership. This decision has significant strategic importance owing to the inherent benefits and risks of each foreign establishment and entry mode. It has often been suggested that FIEs have a competitive disadvantage relative to local firms because of lack of information about local market conditions and the higher costs of communication and transport. To overcome these drawbacks and to operate profitably in global markets, FIEs need some kind of firm-specific advantages (Hymer 1976).
As expressed in Wernerfelts (1984) Resource-Based theory, firm-specific advantages arise from tacit knowledge, including technical knowledge, patents and management skills. Nelson and Winter (1982) showed that tacit knowledge is a component embedded in both individual skills and organisation routines, which create value only in the enterprises in which they have evolved. According to Kogut and Zander (1993), the more tacit the knowledge is, the more enterprises prefer to set up fully-owned FIEs rather than joint ventures. Further, as suggested by Williamsons (1975) Internalisation theory, foreign firms establishing joint ventures with local partners might be subjected to transaction costs arising from writing and enforcing contracts, haggling over terms and contingent claims, and administering transactions.
On the other hand, the literature has also suggested that joint ventures are preferred when investors need access to information, particularly about local market conditions. Kokko et al. (2003) argued that at the beginning of the transition process, the difficulty in access to information about the investment environment in host countries encourages foreign investors to form joint ventures with local firms, especially state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In such cases, the privileged positions and the extensive networks of SOEs can facilitate a smooth entry and success in the market for FIEs. However, at more advanced stages of economic transition, when information is more available to overseas investors, wholly owned subsidiaries are preferred to joint ventures because they avoid the transaction costs of searching, negotiating and monitoring local partners (Meyer 2001).
The process of FDI flows to Vietnam has been in line with above theoretical argument. The entry modes of inward FDI have undergone some changes with a clear trend observed. In the early years under the LFI 1987, there were three entry modes of investment: joint ventures (JV), business corporate contracts (BCC) and wholly foreign invested enterprise (wholly FIE). Most foreign investors preferred to cooperate with Vietnamese partners to establish JVs, and the Vietnamese partners in most cases were SOEs. In this way, the JVs could benefit from privileged access to government and advantages in accessing credit, land ownership and other administrative procedures. Besides, the engagement of overseas investment in JVs helped to deflect the high risk and uncertainty in the economic environment. Overseas partners had to rely on cooperation with SOEs because the development of the domestic private sector was not encouraged equally with SOEs under the LFI at that time. Another reason for the cooperation between foreign investors and SOEs in establishing JVs in Vietnam in the early years was not only that foreign investors tend to rely on SOEs for dealing with the authorities and for land use rights, but also because of the economic uncertainty.
In the early stages, 1988 - 1992, a well-known feature of FDI in Vietnam expressed in the studies of that period was the dominance of the entry mode of JVs, accounting for over 70% of the total registered FDI projects and 75% of the total registered FDI, with over 90% of these JVs having SOEs as the Vietnamese partners. In the early years, foreign investors were unfamiliar with and lacked of information about the Vietnamese investment environment, and SOEs were the only legal partners in JVs. An amendment to the LFI 1992 gave wholly FIEs the same status as JVs, and thereafter JVs declined in their share of the total registered FDI and share in the number of the total registered FDI projects, whereas there was a significant increase in the share of wholly FIEs in terms of the number of projects and the value of committed FDI. By 2001, wholly FIEs accounted for more than 70% of the total registered FDI projects and about 55% of the total registered FDI. The main factor that led to this shift in the ownership structure of FDI inflows appeared to be permitting full overseas ownership of export-oriented enterprises as part of the new FDI policy adopted in 2000. Also, as foreign investors became more familiar with the Vietnamese business environment, it became easier for them to do business independently.
In the period 2001 – 2005, there was a diversification of FDI entry modes when more FDI were entering through either shareholding enterprises or capital holding enterprises while the number of wholly FIEs exceeded JVs. By 2007, wholly FIEs accounted for more than 77.6 % of the licensed FDI projects and 61.6% of the registered FDI, while JVs accounted for only 18.9% of the total licensed FDI projects and 28.9% of the total registered FDI. The rest of the enterprises were BCC with 2.6% of the total licensed FDI projects and 5.4% of the total registered FDI and BOT, BT and BTO projects with 0.1% of the total licensed FDI projects and 2.0% of the total registered FDI. The policy reform had significantly improved the investment environment and overseas investors were now allowed any form of investment in most sectors and services. They followed the trend in preferring to form wholly FIEs, probably in order to avoid conflict and make business decisions easily.
In the early stages, JV projects were, on average, much larger than wholly FIE projects in capital stock because almost all of the JVs were established through cooperation between overseas partners and large SOEs. However, recently this trend has changed and wholly FIE projects are now larger than JV projects. In 2000, JVs invested US$10.7 billion in Vietnam and wholly FIE invested US$6.3 billion; in 2004 JVs invested US$13.4 billion while wholly FIEs invested US$15.9 billion, and in 2008 JVs invested US$21.5 billion while wholly FIEs invested US$45.6 billion (GSO 2013). Further, wholly FIE projects operate in higher export-oriented sectors than JVs. BCC has been often chosen for projects in oil and gas exploration and exploitation, the erection and operation of telecommunications networks and advertisement, while BOT, BTO and BT projects have been often selected for infrastructure construction and development.
In line with the increasing capital investment in Vietnam of wholly FIE projects, the number of wholly FIEs using a large number of employees has been much greater than JVs and has increased over time. For example, there were ten wholly FIE projects employing 5000 workers and above in 2001, 22 wholly FIE projects employing 5000 workers and above in 2005 and 37 wholly FIE projects employing 5000 workers and above in 2008, while there was only one JV project employing 5000 workers and above in 2001, two JV projects employing 5000 workers and above in 2005 and four JV projects employing 5000 workers and above in 2008. By the end of 2011, the number of wholly FIE projects employing 5000 workers and above had increased to 53 while JV projects employing 5000 workers and above had increased to just six .
4. Conclusion
Over the 27 years of FDI operation in Vietnam, the patterns of FDI inflows have changed, largely due to the changing economic context at both international and national levels. The greatest changes at the national level have been brought about by the changes to government policies and regulations on FDI. Although Vietnams government policies have played vital roles in attracting FDI inflows to the country, some aspects of FDI inflows have met the aims and objectives of Vietnamese governments policies, but others have not. FDI inflows have largely shifted from joint ventures to fully foreign-owned ventures, and the number of fully foreign-owned projects with 5000 employees and above has increased over time to meet the objective of Vietnams policy on attracting FDI projects to increase employment. Further, the number of FDI projects in IZs and EPZs has increased steadily to achieve the objective of Vietnams policy on attracting FDI projects in these zones.
However, FDI flows in target sectors of agriculture, human health, education and training are very small and insignificant, even though the Vietnamese government has offered special tax incentives. FDI flows remained concentrated in urban cities and provinces in the economically more advanced South East and Red River Delta regions, while provinces in remote regions receive only a small volume of FDI, despite government policies offering incentives to projects investing in remote areas. Furthermore, although FDI inflows from European countries and the US have been increasing in Vietnam, most FDI projects in this country are small in scale with moderate technology and originating mainly from Asia.
Based on the findings and their explanations of this paper, several significant policy implications are discussed in the context of policy development and reform that Vietnamese policy makers should consider to boost FDI and to attain the desired profile and inward FDI to develop the countrys economy. To successfully attract FDI, Vietnam must offer a favourable investment and policy environment for foreign investors. Policies for improving the Vietnamese investment climate have to relate to both provincial and national levels. The government needs to provide the means to encourage provincial authorities to pursue policies in the same spirit of reform. Decentralisation of FDI-related responsibilities requires further development of institutions at the provincial level. Authorities should consider how to adopt the policy called the government accompanying with enterprises as applied by Dong Nai province and develop friendly government and supportive government, to attract FDI.
The unevenness of provincial FDI distribution should be addressed and improved through various means. For instance, government policies should be adjusted to improve infrastructure in poor and remote provinces in order to speed up the diffusion process of FDI flows to these provinces, and thus achieve more equal provincial FDI distribution. With the diffusion of FDI to poor and remote provinces as the result of infrastructure improvement, FDI inflows would contribute significantly to provincial economic growth and reduce the gap between rich and poor provinces. When the economy of poor provinces is developed, these provinces will spend more on products and services, which in turn will help them to attract more FDI inflows.
It is necessary to offer more investment incentives for FDI projects in the target sectors of agriculture, human health, education and training to solve the problem of the uneven distribution of FDI by industry. In addition, it is necessary to offer incentives for poor and remote provinces to develop special economic zones in order to attract FDI to these provinces. It is also necessary for the Vietnamese government to develop bilateral trade agreements with target countries to compete successfully with other countries in attracting large FDI projects with more employment and high technology from developed countries to develop the Vietnamese economy.
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Các yếu tố liên quan đến chính sách thu hút vốn đầu tư trực tiếp FDI trong thời kỳ “Đổi mới”
Le Thanh Hoa
Sở Tư pháp Cần Thơ, Việt Nam
Le Huynh Phuong Chinh
Khoa Luật, Trường Đại học Cần Thơ
Tóm tắt:
Theo yêu cầu phát triển kinh tế, Chính phủ Việt Nam đã cố gắng phát triển và hoàn thiện các chính sách liên quan đến đầu tư trực tiếp FDI nhằm đảm bảo việc thu hút đầu tư trực tiếp FDI về số lượng và cả chất lượng. Nhìn chung, Chính phủ Việt Nam thể hiện ưu đãi chính sách về thuế đối với các dự án đầu tư trực tiếp FDI đối với lĩnh vực công nghệ cao, thu hút nhiều lao động, ở những vùng có điều kiện kinh tế - xã hội đặc biệt khó khăn, thuộc những lĩnh vực nông nghiệp, y tế, giáo dục và những khu vực kinh tế đặc biệt. Những nghiên cứu trong phạm vi bài viết này sẽ phân tích, đánh giá các yếu tố liên quan đến chính sách thu hút vốn đầu tư trực tiếp FDI vào Việt Nam thời gian qua, đồng thời đề xuất một số giải pháp về chính sách, pháp luật thu hút FDI trong thời kỳ tới.
Từ khóa: Mô hình FDI, chính sách, đổi mới.
